"The Diamond Pipeline": Between Africa and the Arab World

Nahrain Al-Mousawi
University of California, Los Angeles

Introduction: Discourses of Afro-Arab Relations

In the "Age of Terror," blood diamonds have come to occupy a central place in the way the relationship between the Arab world and Africa is understood.[1] While the connection between "terrorist networks" and diamond smuggling in Sierra Leone has brought attention to blood diamonds, journalistic and human rights reports have glibly narrativized Afro-Arab relations through the schema of terrorists, mercenaries, and rebels operating across diamond pipelines.[2] This paper demonstrates (i) how the relationship between Africa and the Arab world is conceived through cultural productions, like newspaper articles and human rights reports, (ii) that the representation of this relationship through current cultural productions constitutes a body of work reinforcing the "War on Terror", and (iii) how other cultural productions have worked to symbolize the national and global tensions between containment and interdependence through the symbol of the family, a microcosm of Afro-Arab relations wherein containment and its implications of purity, loyalty, and exclusion are explored in the arguably closed spaces of domesticity. In essence, home—the closed, isolated space par excellence—provides an ideal space for exploring Afro-Arab relations in terms of containment because of the way it draws boundaries between self and other in the most quotidian sense.

In American scholarship, calls for "containment" against the politically diseased vectors of the Arab world and Africa—where tribalism, refugee flows, and sectarianism threaten to contaminate the West—have helped stage the "War on Terror."[3] Calls for "containment" also abound in human rights literature, but the positions have been realigned so that Africa's "weak" political climate is seen to be at risk from the "poisoned" strains of Middle Eastern insurgency. In transferring orientalism to the African scene, by drawing the Afro-Arab relationship in terms of otherness and difference, such scholarship hopes to materialize the imaginary of containment. The isolation of Arab otherness and difference via such rhetorical strategies may not necessarily translate to a policy of containment in the name of expediting national security. This is because orientalism is not always aimed toward isolation, according to the

dangers evoked by otherness and difference, but is sometimes geared toward further involvement, to further draw and check the boundaries of otherness.

American containment policy toward Third-World terrorist threats in the name of expediting national security is rooted in the Cold War era.[4] After the Second World War, containment constituted the grand American strategy for deterring Soviet expansionism. Today, according to politicians and researchers, the logic of containment is less effective in the "War on Terror" than it was in the Cold War, as it is deemed too "soft" and un-pragmatic a response to violent stateless entities (i.e., how does one deter stateless enemies?).[5] However, the new containment strategy, conceived in line with the "War on Terror," has much in common with pre-emptive strikes integral to the Bush Doctrine. Part of the new containment strategy is the securitization of Africa; indeed, US policy towards Africa has become increasingly militaristic. The "War on Terror" has justified the increased US military presence in Africa, particularly in "the Horn, in the oil rich states, and in the Sahel, a buffer zone between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa."[6] In fact, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, issued by the White House in 2002, announced that the entire continent demonstrated the dimensions of a "weak state," susceptible to terrorist infiltration.[7] 9/11 attacks were integrated in policies not only toward the Middle East but Africa, as well, to point to the ways dangers in the continent were overflowing to the West. Weak and failed states became major targets of counter-terrorism policies as they ostensibly presented a danger not only to local populations but to global security. When news of Al Qaeda's diamond trade in Sierra Leone emerged, the threat of Africa's "weak states" as "free trade zone[s] of the underworld" gained further traction.[8]

Investigators describe access to diamonds by networks like Al Qaeda "the diamond pipeline," drawing links between Middle Eastern "terrorist networks" and West Africa.[9] The term reinforces an image of the Middle Eastern petrodollar, always available and abundant, coursing through international "oil pipelines" to court Africa's elite. "Diamond pipeline," in effect, conflates the planting of pipelines into the land with the artful, "bazaar-type" insinuation of Middle Eastern networks into the "underground world" of diamond dealing and African politics (16). Lansana Gberie describes "pricing fixing" among Lebanese traders as a "bazaar-type" manipulation of the market. He does not stop at describing a practice as secretive, manipulative, deceptive, and clannish. Rather, he uses "bazaar-type" to indicate price fixing as ethnically Middle Eastern.

A figurative term to begin with, referring to the flow of diamonds from mine to consumer and through a series of buyers, the diamond pipeline's resonance with the oil pipeline provides insight into how the relationship between Africa and the Arab world is conceived through cultural production. Just as networks of sightholders, wholesalers, and retailers comprise the diamond pipeline, one of its final products, the discourse of Afro-Arab relations, has also been shaped, promoted, and

sold through different registers in the economy of discourse. The current register for the economy of discourse for Afro-Arab relations hinges on African securitization and containment from Arab immigration, imported nationalisms, and terrorist networks (Arabic, Arabic-Islamic, or even multi-national networks, like Al Qaeda).

In this article, close readings of the work of journalist Douglas Farah and human rights analyst Lansana Gberie reveal how the discourse of containment emerges from the pipeline. A comparison of containment and securitization discourse between journalistic and human rights scholarship and the literary genre of novels reveals how the logic of containment is disrupted. The comparison of the novels to human rights and journalistic reports is not intended to undermine them, but rather points to a shared aspect of their respective projects: the critical consciousness of Lebanon's relationship to Africa. While human rights and journalistic reports suggest the containment of Africa from the Arab world as a *solution*, the novels pose *as a problem* Lebanese nationalism and nationalist identification as a form of containment from Africa (as well as neighboring Palestine). The novels, *Death in Beirut* by Tawfiq Awwad and *The Story of Zahra* by Hanan Al-Shaykh, take their place on the pipeline of Afro-Arab relations, through their treatment of lineage and family as metaphors for Lebanese nationalism. The texts present failed familial relationships connecting Africa and Lebanon to problematize the lineage inherited from family and nation, as well as familial and national identification. Although the transnational alliances in the novels are Arab, they also invoke the failures of nationalist alliances. My analysis does not interpret the novels as guidelines for a successful relationship between Africa and the Arab world, but rather reveals that they point to a problematic relationship based on exclusionary, closed nationalistic identification, rather than open borders and furtive cooperativeness.

This article takes the geopolitical strategy of containment in the global imaginary to its inevitable conclusion with the day-to-day portrait of containment in the novels—from the containment of the domestic space, to the family itself, the maintenance of the filiative border, the containment of the "bloodlines." By placing the genres side-by-side, this article shows the stark inextricability of a geopolitical strategy of containment from containment of borders, border crossers, and the migrants themselves. The isolation of the Arab world from Africa can be discussed glibly in terms of national security expeditions and geopolitical strategy but it cannot bypass a discussion of its inevitable conclusions: the isolation of "Arab" and "African" identities as givens—as two distinct identities that cannot be claimed as one. It erases a history built upon shared customs, traditions, and alliances; ultimately, the novels' expression of the danger of asserting the integrity of "bloodlines," or a denial that one belongs to another, is one expression of a broader containment strategy.

Narrative Travel through the Pipeline: Discourses of Security and Containment

The narrativization of Afro-Arab relations requires a brief background of the resource at stake: blood diamonds are illicitly sold to sustain armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The war in Sierra Leone—during which 75,000 are estimated to have been killed and 4.5 million displaced—began in 1991 and officially ended in 2002 following a UN-coordinated disarmament policy. The majority of the Lebanese resident in Sierra Leone at the time fled. The country's already negligible population dwindled from 20,000 to 2,000. The 2002 implementation of the Kimberley Process, a certification scheme for participating countries to guarantee that incoming shipments of rough diamonds are not blood diamonds, was intended to arrest the entrance of conflict diamonds into the pipeline's network of "sightholders, wholesalers, and retailers".[10] What prompted support for the Kimberley Process was the discovery of Al Qaeda's conversion of US $20 million into conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone.

Washington Post West Africa Bureau Chief, Douglas Farah, was one of the prominent journalists following the diamond trail to Al Qaeda operatives. Anticipating US intelligence would probe into its finances in 1998, Al Qaeda transferred funds from banks into the virtually untraceable currency of diamonds. In a series of articles, Farah reveals a network between Lebanese Hezbollah and multinational Al Qaeda to finance global insurgency operations using conflict diamonds.[11] For decades, Hezbollah utilized connections with established Lebanese communities in West Africa, particularly Sierra Leone, to provide finances to insurgency networks in Lebanon, resources that it eventually shared with Al Qaeda operatives.

Although Farah's articles have brought much-needed attention to conflict diamonds, they are a product of the parallel linguistic pipeline that produces the current discourse of securitization in Afro-Arab relations. Farah calls on the intelligence community to refocus attention on pockets of Africa as "havens" for terrorist networks, because these networks can operate more freely in "weak" states. Farah's call for the transformation of the intelligence community's focus on the threat to Africa implies a call for the same kind of "adaptability" with which he characterizes terrorist networks in "rogue regimes."[12] By pointing to the mainly Lebanese Shi'i Muslim communities in West Africa as the source of funding for Hezbollah's acquisition of diamonds, he characterizes the Lebanese presence itself (whether it constitutes an affiliation with terrorist networks or not) as a security threat.

While Farah reports that the intelligence community refers to the connection between "terrorist networks" and diamond smuggling as the "diamond pipeline," the term has become part of a more extensive language of national security. It describes the terrorist networks' access to

West African diamonds, but in security discourse it also paints the Arab world and Africa as persistent sites of international insecurity: the term is used to resonate with the oil pipeline, the source of the Middle Eastern petrodollar, in order to draw West Africa as a playground for "terrorist networks." The term's association with the oil pipeline, the structural insinuation of pipelines into the land, also evokes the aggressive insinuation of Middle Eastern politics into the "underground world" of diamond dealing and African politics. The implication that Middle Eastern politics is insinuating itself into Africa in security discourse has not only found a place in newspapers but resonates in human rights work concerning conflict diamonds.

The human-rights analysis of Lansana Gberie, from human-rights group Partnership Africa Canada, typifies such language of security and containment.[13] In his analysis of the blood diamond trade, Gberie maps out a historiography of Lebanese ethnic determinism in West Africa that, in turn, prompts his warnings of a Middle Eastern security threat to Africa evidenced by his provocative notion of a "virulent" Middle Eastern politics lacking in containment (18).

The narrative of Afro-Arab relations as one of violation may benefit from a historicization of Lebanese immigration to West Africa, as such a historicization will establish that connections between Lebanon and West Africa predate "terrorist networks" and Lebanese diamond merchants. Second, this historicized paradigm intervenes in Gberie's perspective of Lebanese diamond smuggling as ethnically determined and inevitably linked to early exploitation and resource extraction in Africa.

Chris Bierwirth, a historian of Lebanese migration to Côte d'Ivoire, asserts that the first wave of Lebanese immigration to Côte d'Ivoire in the 1920s originated in other West African areas, rather than from Lebanon at the time of the French Mandate. The newly created French export colonial economy encouraged Lebanese migration to West Africa. Fleeing sectarian tensions and violence as well as a declining economy in Lebanon, migrants found it easier to gain entry into West Africa than the Americas. In addition, the move from French dominion of Lebanon to French dominions of West Africa greatly facilitated immigration. Bierwirth explains that Lebanese migrants gradually and tactically worked their way into intermediary positions. When the Lebanese began to compete with French businesses, anti-Syrian campaigns began: the Chambre de Commerce in Côte d'Ivoire launched campaigns against the "Lebanese Menace" and "le péril syrien" for infringing on the new colonial economy in the early part of the twentieth century.[14]

Although Toyin Falola's article "Lebanese Traders in Southwestern Nigeria, 1900-1960" focuses on Lebanese traders in Nigeria, it offers a comparative view to Gberie's and Bierwirth's works on the Lebanese in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. Falola argues that the claim that Lebanese immigration was encouraged and sponsored by the colonial government proves an "exaggeration" (523). Like Bierwirth, Falola claims that Lebanese immigration was prompted by Lebanon's declining economic

conditions, poverty, and sectarian tensions. Moreover, he asserts that after 1934, colonial regulations often prohibited the immigration of Lebanese "without the means" to contribute to the colonial economy in Nigeria.

Historical scholarship indicates that Lebanon's failing economy and the potential opportunities migrants saw in the new colonial export economy proved a far more compelling motivation for Lebanese migration to West Africa than a colonial strategy to displace West African merchant communities. In contrast to Bierwirth, who claims Lebanese migrants tactically worked their way into intermediary positions, Gberie argues that colonial authorities pursued and encouraged the Lebanese to act as middlemen and attributes their success to loans and incentives to move into the interior as the colonial authorities' favored merchant group and "middlemen," rather than as targets of anti-immigration campaigns.

Gberie's historical background of the Lebanese merchant diaspora posits the Middle East as a perennial security threat to Africa. Gberie reduces Lebanese involvement in diamond smuggling to ethnic and cultural factors, portraying the history of early Lebanese migration as replete with corrupt business practices that inevitably conflates it with current exploitation and resource extraction. He traces the "corrupt" economic lineage of Sierra Leone's diamond industry to the 1930s Lebanese merchant community, linking the "corruption" of early diamond mining to those arrested and deported in the 1950s for illicit trading. Gberie traces the lineage of Lebanese merchants further back to establish a pattern of corrupt business practices, and launching into an account of Sierra Leone's 1919 rice riots—which Lebanese merchants were suspected of fomenting—he writes:

> [Lebanese] success created widespread hostility among the local population, not least because the Lebanese were suspected of hoarding and smuggling goods in order to artificially increase prices. In 1919, following a widespread rice scarcity, riots broke out in Freetown, directed mainly against Lebanese merchants. Shops were broken into by mobs, and hoarded rice was sold at vastly reduced prices. (10)

Gberie maps out a historiography steeped in ethnic determinism, so that rice hoarders in the early part of the century are transformed into present-day diamond smugglers. He even portrays British colonial officials in 1919 rising above the "colonial cause in Africa" and demonstrating "sufficient" concern over Lebanese hoarding (10). Gberie's ethnic determinism figures in the discourse of security that emerges in his work's paradigm of human rights. Not only does this portrait essentialize the Lebanese as an ethnic security threat to West Africa but critically—the whole of the Middle East.

At the same time, Gberie ironically attributes the "new geography of conflict" to export commodities, rather than ideological or ethnic divisions (12). Simultaneously dismissing and invoking ethnicity as a pivotal element in the "geography of conflict" wherein commodities occupy the "fault lines" in an "ethnic" void, he claims,

> Much of the evidence linking West Africa's Lebanese diaspora to global terror networks is anecdotal and circumstantial. Lebanese involvement with the rebel army, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, is also largely anecdotal, but in both cases the stories are supported by generations of shady business practices, and by the strong interest of some of the Lebanese in the virulent politics of the Middle East. (16)

What he sums up as "generations of shady business practice," exemplified by the evolution of the Lebanese from rice hoarder to diamond smuggler, compels him to link West Africa's Lebanese to "terror networks" (16). Moreover, Gberie draws a portrait of the Middle East (not simply the Lebanese diaspora in West Africa) as an uncontained disease vector destabilizing West Africa, "virulent" in its capacity to extend the reach of global terror networks. The Middle Eastern security threat to Africa, evoked by Gberie, aligns with the current discourse of containment and securitization characterizing Afro-Arab relations. "Containment" appears not only in human rights work but also in academic texts. These threats are figured in terms of the encroachment of the Middle East upon the West and the poisoned strains of Middle Eastern insurgency penetrating Africa's borders.

Gberie's arguments concerning Lebanese control of the diamond industry in "presenting major obstacles to meaningful reform" (1) are valid . However, his anxieties about Middle Easterners moving across the borders of West Africa, infusing the political "virulence" of the "region's never-ending conflicts" (16) into Africa's weak political landscape, are reminiscent of quasi-security tracts warning of the threat Africans trespassing Western borders pose. Containment of the Middle East's "virulence" from Africa also conjures the Cold-War representation of Africa as a chaotic landscape on which "red weeds" of communism could grow without containment.[15] In the "War on Terror," motifs of containment have changed to accommodate the representation of the Arab world's relationship to Africa: the Eastern Bloc has been replaced by the "virulent" Middle East, and "red weeds" have been reconfigured as "terrorist cells," penetrating Africa's "weakened" borders.

The connection between "terrorist networks" and blood diamonds facilely narrativizes Afro-Arab relations into a schema of terrorists, mercenaries, and rebels. As readers or consumers of human rights and journalistic texts assimilate this logic, it becomes necessary to problematize this pipeline of narrativization. Placing an analysis of current journalistic and human-rights narratives alongside a reading of the novels deconstructs the ready-made symbols of terrorists, mercenaries, and rebels. While the human rights reports and journalistic accounts privilege the preservation of boundaries, the novels problematize the nationalist processes of cordoning off individuals, communities, nations, and the nationalist identifications that they engender.

Novels in the Pipeline: Beyond Containment, Nationalism, and Lineage

The novels *Death in Beirut* by Tawfiq Awwad and *The Story of Zahra* by Hanan Al-Shaykh take their place on the "diamond pipeline" of Lebanese literary production in West Africa and, more broadly, Afro-Arab relations. Just as the term "diamond pipeline" is used to analyze the discourse of security and containment shaping the relationship between Africa and the Arab world, the term reflects on the emergence of Africa in the consciousness of two Lebanese novels. Both novels are crisscrossed with the boundaries and routes of diasporic Lebanese in West Africa. The emergence of Africa in the novels, the immigration of the protagonist's father to Guinea in *Death in Beirut* and the protagonist's migration to Africa in *The Story of Zahra,* reveal what much of the recent literature generated by human-rights organizations and journalists do not: that the connections between Lebanon and West Africa extend further back than relationships established between "terrorist networks" and war faction groups. The sense of order, causality, and inevitability in current newspapers and scholarship on the Lebanese in Africa is juxtaposed against the disorder and "episodism" of the novels' structures. The sense of rootedness that seems possible to the migrants in the novels conflicts with suggestions that they are outsiders mediating national boundaries solely based on resource extraction and self-enrichment.

The strategy of containment encouraged by journalist and human-rights reports contrasts with the novels' critical engagement with the impassible limits containing the "outsider," the Arab from the African (and vice-versa). This is not to say that these identities are mutually exclusive, or that Arabs and Africans have fixed and distinct qualities differentiating them both from each other, as well as from Westerners. Such identities are not self-evident. The parameters of identity shift over time and are negotiated within the context of changing political and economic processes. But these identities have been mobilized in the interests of two predominant political claims: securitization in the "War on Terror" discourse of a weakened African political landscape, in danger of the furtive exploitation and terrorism of the Arab other, and the Lebanese securitization of the family and bloodline from contamination.

Although there is a 14-year gap between the publication of *Death in Beirut* in 1972 and *The Story of Zahra* in 1986, the novels function not only as historical markers for the pipeline that produces Afro-Arab relations but also for the Lebanese civil war that stretched from 1975 to 1990. *Death in Beirut* reveals the emergence of civil conflict and *The Story of Zahra* explores this conflict at its most intense stage. Moreover, the novels raise themes of exclusionary nationalism and national identification emergent in the civil war. In *Death in Beirut,* Awwad's protagonist Tamima experiences the encroachment of a civil war in the form of student demonstrations, Palestinian Fedayeen resistance, and anti-

government discourse in Beirut, following the 1967 war. In *The Story of Zahra*, Al-Shaykh situates Zahra in the midst of Lebanon's civil war, the influx of Palestinian refugees, and Israel's 1982 invasion only to sacrifice Zahra to her sniper lover's "gun sights." Insofar as the novels portray the ways the war was fought over the construction of the nation, problematic familial relationships provide a parallel construction to the struggles of inventing a community. Through struggles with the war and nationalist identifications emerge crises of family betrayal that indicate the possibility of creating new alliances (not based on family or nation), evoking Edward Said's shift from filiative to affiliative identification in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. For Said, filiation operates from an *instinctual* or natural matrix that defines belonging in terms of biological continuity. Affiliation, on the other hand, operates from a *conscious* cultural or social matrix that defines belonging in terms of institutions, associations, and communities. However, ties of filiation do not merely indicate blood ties or subordination to the traditional authority of family bonds and genealogical structures. Filiation, according to Said, also embraces the patrimonial aspect of national identification as inheritance or legacy, a matter of genealogy and descent, mimicking "the unreflective assumption of 'natal' belonging."[16] In the novels, within the filiative order, the logic of containment operates in preserving the inherited boundaries of national belonging.

Death in Beirut

In the opening scenes of *Death in Beirut*, disruption of lineage in the figure of a car serves as proleptic imagery for the challenge to the genealogy of authority based on filiative ties (to both the family and the nation). The protagonist Tamima stands on her hometown road of Mahdiyya in Lebanon, anxiously reflecting upon a squandered youth, the extended absence of her father who sends letters and remittances from Guinea, and the domineering hold of her brother. Embedded in Tamima's anxious reflections is a rusty, decrepit, inoperable "Nash," a car model not manufactured since 1958. The car's death and outdatedness function as a synecdoche for the ailing and stagnant conditions of the village from which "Africa had claimed the great part of the population and Kuwait accounted for the rest with its offer of easy work and quick fortunes" (3). Moreover, the car's corpse and the outdated model foreshadow a problematic engagement with lineage that hinges on the narrative of an absent father and a violent brother. The car was "decrepit" and "lame" when it arrived in Mahdiyya, resigned upon deflating the illusion of progress, modernity, and prosperity that had been projected onto the socioeconomic Lebanese landscape: "All traces of the Nash had long disappeared from the face of the earth, but Mahdiyya's Nash still groaned and rattled on dislocated joints, going to and from Mahdiyya" (2). The car's lineage can be traced to the Nash Company, but the relationship

between producer and product has been "discontinued," ceasing to operate except in discourse that circles back to a past relationship.

Awwad inserts the Nash, a product invested in "motoring and roads," and, "by definition, erasing boundaries and reclassifying space" into an anxiety-ridden narrative about the disruption of familial and local lineage.[17] He also establishes the frustration between the promise of modernity and progress in Lebanon and the reality of sectarianism and nationalism by then pronouncing it nearly dead on arrival to "lay down in the main square, imploring the Lord's mercy" (2). Years before Awwad halts the motor of the Nash in Mahdiyya, the car's marketplace momentum reached its end with the line's discontinuation in 1958. The year of the car's extinction highlights an underlying discrepancy between the myth of modernity and progress and the reality of its death—not only in Tamima's independent but embattled Lebanon but in her father's post-independence Guinea, as it lay ravaged by France's withdrawal in 1958.[18]

The car's immobility foreshadows a thwarted promise of crossing, "erasing boundaries" in Lebanon's accelerating sectarianism and nationalism. Boundaries and routes of threatened southern Lebanese borders, Israeli invasions, Palestinian Fedayeen, exodus of guest workers to Kuwait, and diasporic Lebanese in Africa and their remittances crisscross the novels. The discontinued car model (a mirror for the producer-product) also functions as critical and proleptic imagery for the disrupted ties of filiation that mark both Tamima's family in Lebanon and the one she discovers in Guinea. The novel engages this lineage not only within the bounds of the Arab world, but in terms of a broader relationship between Lebanese migrants and their connections to Africa.

While reflecting on the extended absence of her father, Tamir, who sends letters and remittances from Guinea, Tamima discovers he had been arrested for diamond smuggling. She receives a sickbed confessional letter from him, detailing his arrival in Guinea and his near-death experience with sleeping sickness. This revelation is pivotal to his long-kept secret: the girl who had nursed him back to life, Fanta, became his wife and bore him a daughter, Aisha. After revealing the existence of her Guinean sister, Tamir abruptly moves to explain his innocence in the diamond-smuggling scheme. Tamir reveals what ultimately confines him to his deathbed: under the pretext of immigrating to Guinea and demonstrating a desire to meet his sister, Jaber had taken possession of his father's savings and raped his half-sister, Aisha, before returning to Lebanon. Upon hearing what Jaber had done, Tamir becomes deathly ill. He writes to Tamima:

> My daughter, I don't know what Jaber did with the fruit of the sweat and blood of his father in Africa. The only thing that I am afraid of, as I told you, is what he may do to you and your mother over there, after what he has done here to Aisha and me and her grandfather, that poor old man … Your little sister was grieving over the loss of what is the thing dearest to sisters. She was a creature who had been insulted, scorned, and wounded in a way for which she had no name, no balm, no consolation. (134)

Jaber's incestuous rape functions as a symbol of exclusion from the family and the nation to which he belongs. Within this story of a Guinean-Lebanese family, Awwad introduces Jaber as an allegorical figure of Lebanese exploitation in Africa. Awwad portrays Jaber's relationship to Africa as one based on looting and raping—actions of enemy occupation rather than familial bonding. Awwad posits Jaber as a sexist and a figure of nationalist discourse, invested in the glorification of the nation's mythological, pure, and pristine past: he thwarts Tamima's attempts to go to college and become a teacher, attributing her independence to a contaminating foreign culture. As much as his relationship with Tamima, his "fully" Lebanese sister, is violent and unequal, it does not involve sexual violation—as opposed to the relationship with his Guinean-Lebanese sister. This nationalist identification thus renders him a threat not only to his sister in Lebanon but also to his sister in Guinea, whom he violates based on perceptions of national and cultural purity. Jaber's visit to secure a binding of his ties to his Guinean-Lebanese family turns out to be premised on a denial of those ties. After raping Aisha and looting his father's resources, he returns to his Lebanese family, to his Lebanese homeland. That Jaber *contains* the economic and sexual threat directed at his family in Guinea suggests that he has drawn the boundaries of filiative responsibility along national lines: filiative responsibility, in this sense, is tied to national identity. Aisha's rape stands for a conflation of denied filiation in the national sense and denied filiation in the familial sense: it is a product of the denial of national belonging invested with the message of familial un-belonging. The rape conveys a message both about a denial of (familial) lineage and of (national) authenticity not only to his father, but, unwittingly, to Tamima as well, about the rights of belonging to a family based on a unitary national identity.

Situating a discussion of Jaber's rape of his sister as a denial of filiative ties based on national belonging beside Tamima's move toward more conscious political affiliations helps elucidate Awwad's criticism of exclusionary national identification. Awwad tells the rape through an epistolary narrative. The letter within the narrative functions climactically for Tamima: it signals filiation, based on the authority of national legitimacy that Jaber creates, in the violent and fragmented family collapse, as a primary means of identification. The structure of the novel is key to revealing Tamima's shift from filiation to affiliation: Awwad creates a narrative containing another narrative (the letter) that provides a framing effect wherein it is possible to witness the consequence of a lineage denied within the promise of asserting politicized alliances based not on "random accidents of birth" binding self to nation.[19] As previously mentioned, within the filiative order the logic of containment globally operates in preserving the inherited boundaries of national belonging in the arena of politics, whether it is in the global imaginary of containment or Lebanese nationalism. But this self-destructive logic of alienation and isolation for the sake of self-preservation—of containment—also operates in the day-to-day, quotidian spaces of familial relationships.

While the major part of the novel circles around familial lineage by lingering on Tamir's polygamy and African daughter, his letter about Aisha's rape is the text-within-the-text that operates centrifugally, bringing into question the lineage inherited from the nation. In Tamir's letter this violation creates a rupture that is not only stylistic but politicizing: Tamima is projected from a nationalist student movement to a radicalized landscape of transnational armed struggle, the Palestinian Fedayeen resistance in southern Lebanon. Awwad situates the letter and the rape it describes in the midst of this radical shift toward transnationalism to highlight Aisha's rape as symbolic of the dangers of nationalist exclusion around which the major narrative revolves.

The rape unravels the bonds of filiation that produced it in the first place; it functions as the product of a violently racist and nationalist exclusion and as the catalyst of this nationalism's destruction. Thus, the bonds of filiation consume themselves—inasmuch as they preserve the boundaries that contain the "outsider" from the self, they contain themselves. This self-destructive aspect of exclusionary identification resides in the figure of Tamir who redraws Jaber's boundaries of legitimacy and legitimate succession. In the letter, Tamir begins in a third-person voice, replete with heroizing imagery of "black adventure" that situates him in the center of drunk "natives," stifling heat, and the "curse" of imminent mortality brought on by tsetse flies and breeding snakes (129-131). In confessing failure to protect his daughter, Tamir shifts to the first-person pronoun upon discussing Aisha: he reinforces an assertion of that lineage to enunciate the bonds of their relationship and to distinguish himself from Jaber's rejection of that lineage. Tamir restructures the family hierarchy by disowning Jaber, giving Aisha his name, and leaving Tamima his sole property, the banana plantation he had managed upon arriving in Guinea. Ultimately, Jaber is thrust out of the family.

Familial space rearticulates the struggles of containment and the exclusionary national identification it engenders in quotidian terms, the everyday processes of family visits, land ownership and inheritance, and the crises of violation within. Revisiting the global imaginary of containment in terms of Afro-Arab relations and the orientalism it reproduces, the novel presents the reader with a sociospatial order that demands absolute division, segregation, and external force, reminiscent of Fanon's "Manichean geography." An absolute separation, an outside distinct from an inside, the organization in "Manichean geography" permits no fluidity or contradictions, no space for dialectic potential or interlocution in terms of movement ("divided into compartments", "cut in two") (37-38). A binarized space in which self and other, African and Arab, are segregated according to the global imaginary of containment finds its logical expression in the quotidian space of the home. In one sense, the discourse of containment hinges on a naturalized sociospatial order. If crossing borders and resisting the logic of containment involves an assertion of subjectivity, a right to move, migrate, escape, seek refuge, or simply to decide to live elsewhere, *domopolitics* resists this assertion.

This political order galvanizes images of "home," *domus,* a naturalized order of states and people, of self and other, in a manner that suppresses these subjectivities.[20] The home is the closed, isolated space par excellence, accentuating in the novel Arab and African identities that have been re-mobilized in opposition to one another, in need of securitization, a closed threshold, from each other.

In another sense, the use of everyday aspects of the home and the family to bring into focus Afro-Arab relations produces a sense of transience and transition, enabling fluidity and interlocution that defies a Manichean geography of containment. The possibility of transformation resides in the everyday, and this entails a dynamic, volatile, laborious everyday—one that anticipates the possibilities of newness rather than a static one that charts a programmatic development of identities into secured subjects. The everyday connects with the macrological dimensions of the social order, i.e., containment, nationalism, exclusion and nationalist identification. The home and the quotidian play a strategic role in connecting radical ruptures (diamond smuggling, civil conflict, colonialism, political unrest) with the molecular changes—thus the everyday emerges as mediation of radical politics. The macrological dimensions of political power—expressed in the global imaginary of containment and its Lebanese nationalist counterpart—are undermined in those instances when they are set alongside the micrological stories of the everyday. The potential of a shift in consciousness defying the imaginary of containment resides in the crossroads of the micrological and the macrological dimensions of political power.

The shift in consciousness is emblematized when Tamima draws Aisha's story out of a family crisis and identifies Aisha with a larger shared history of betrayal between Lebanese diasporas and African communities. Tamima and Aisha hold different positions in narrative tenor, content and flow. Tamima resides in the foreground of Beirut's sectarian battles and rising nationalism. The tragic figure of Aisha ("weeping on [her grandfather's] arm and burying her face in his bosom" [134]) resides in the background of her father's narrative of problematic familial relationships, of paternal failures and fraternal violation, before it recedes in Tamima's elegiac but empathic response: "All of them in Africa had their Aishas, wronged and ill-treated. And they all had their scores of Fanta's sisters" (135). After Tamima reads her father's letter, she claims it has the "taste of the blood she had tasted that night—her own blood," conflating lineage, violation, and her body's rejection of the bloodline (135).

The rape also galvanizes Tamima's challenge to the genealogy of authority based exclusively on filiative ties that draw the boundaries of national belonging: Jaber's attempt at erasure, a denial of lineage, by raping Aisha precipitates Tamima's attempt at an erasure of her own lineage in a political context. The student movements she joins offer an alternative means of building affiliations based on political visions. But within the movement, emerging voices align with a nationalistic claim to

defend Lebanon against the Palestinian Fedayeen. The student movement indicates this shift from affiliations based on shared political visions to predominantly nationalist affiliations: "The job of defending Lebanon should be assigned to the Lebanese guerilla struggle in favor of Lebanese nationalist "honour and sovereignty" (176). The movement's exclusion of the Palestinian guerilla struggle in favor of Lebanese nationalist "honour and sovereignty" precipitates Tamima's disaffiliation from the student movement. Her relationship with the Palestinian Fedayeen reveals she has replaced "primary affiliations" of the village and the family, or rather filiative relationships, with student-movement affiliation. At the end, Tamima not only leaves her home and drops her name, but rejects "national identity" by breaking with the movement as soon as it begins to advocate a nationalist struggle. She leaves behind a journal with a plan to join the Fedayeen and to shed her name, in the closing sentence: "From the moment I set off with the man no more will be heard of the name of Tamima Nassour" (185). She discards not only the patronym that offers legitimacy in the family but also the patrimonial aspect of national belonging as an instinctual inheritance or legacy.

Between narrative content and structure resides an aperture of possibility in diverting the lineage inherited from both family and nation. The possibility is evident in the direction on the road that Tamima starts out with in Mahdiyya—difficult to cross with a dead car—to recognition of the violence of filiative belonging that her brother's rape of their sister in Guinea engenders, and then to the quest toward affiliative ties with the armed struggle of the Fedayeen. The tenor of the narrative locates Tamima in a diachronic trajectory of episodes that propel her toward the Palestinian armed struggle. Aisha is situated in a timeless, ahistorical Guinea, untouched by any historical event except for a publicized account of Lebanese diamond smuggling. Tamima extracts Aisha out of this ahistorical narrative by identifying her with a larger history of betrayal. Moreover, the style of the narratives, particularly the epistolary narratives that mark Tamima's knowledge of a sister in Africa and the broader narration of her shift to a more radical position in Lebanese society, function further to align the characters. Their alignment in the text calls into question inherited lineage—both familial and political. While Aisha emerges only in her father's letter to Tamima, Tamima reveals herself before she slips out of her name at the end of the novel. She submerges herself not only in another identity, but in another narrative wherein she becomes as elusive as Aisha, but in a manner that foreshadows what she calls her "way to [her] destiny" (84) into an underground guerilla unit. By submerging herself in such a narrative, acting as both the framer and the enframed, Tamima draws attention to the potential of growing and effective power under repression.

Al-Shaykh's *The Story of Zahra* also locates its eponymous protagonist within a crisis of family betrayals, created by her adulterous mother, violent father, and dangerously naive brother who confuses "revolution" with hashish smoking and theft. Zahra attempts to escape by leaving her family in Beirut and joining her estranged uncle in an unnamed African state. Horrified by her uncle's sexual advances, Zahra, sexually abused as a child, discovers that she has not escaped the pattern of familial threats and failures; the pattern extends to "Africa," as she simply calls her new home.

Al-Shaykh posits her critique of exclusionary Lebanese nationalism in Africa via Zahra's uncle. Having been an active figure in Lebanese politics, Uncle Hashem is an "exile" living in an African nation by the time Zahra visits. After a failed assassination attempt in Beirut, Hashem flees to "Africa," but fails to make alliances with Lebanese ex-party members as well as the African communities that encircle the Lebanese interior. His image of Africa is centered on a clichéd symbolism:

> You were my choice, Africa! I preferred you to Brazil or Jordan because I have been dreaming of you since my tender childhood. I dreamed of your elephants, of your colors, your drum-beats. There were those eternal designs on ivory … I would tell myself, "How I wish to have my woman lying down and sleeping as the drums beat and I fan her with an ostrich-feather fan, peel pineapples for her and hold a coconut to her lips. I want to hear the voices of the jungle with her and see Tarzan and Cheeta themselves." (43)

Al-Shaykh eschews a specific setting (like a city or town in "Africa") to demonstrate Hashem's detachment from the material conditions of life in "Africa." He has drawn the boundaries of national identification only in his imagination. Through Zahra, Al-Shaykh disrupts bonds of national identification that reside mostly in Hashem's imagination. Upon Zahra's arrival at the airport in "Africa," Uncle Hashem indicates that she fills him with a sense of "homeland" (43). Al-Shaykh's criticism of exiled Lebanese people whose concept of homeland is discordant with its reality is expressed in Zahra's frustration with her uncle. Zahra complains that Hashem confuses the "symbolic image" with the "actual homeland, the every-day homeland" (20). Referring to the discrepancy between the symbolic and actual homeland, Zahra also indicates the discrepancy between the symbolic and material Africa to which Hashem clings. Just as his image of Africa is centered on a clichéd symbolism of geography and cultural artifice, his nostalgic yearning for Lebanon is based on its geographical markers rather than the politics that have ravaged the geographical space and the social body of Lebanon. Both serve to further intensify his sense of alienation and an isolating national identification.

Al-Shaykh disrupts the bonds of national identification that primarily reside in Hashem's imagination: Zahra sets upon thwarting Hashem's

hopes of capturing a nostalgic sense of homeland through the terrain of her body. As in *Death in Beirut*, sexual violation engenders filiation. Zahra resists Hashem's quest for a national "homeland" through her body, revealing herself to be as elusive and unpredictable as Lebanon is to its residents. Zahra is also prevented from securing a sense of identity through homeland, as revealed by her attempts to make sense of Lebanon's irreconcilable realities.

Filiation collapses as a primary means of identification for Zahra, as it does for Tamima. Her quest for other affiliations propel her into "madness," a paralyzing anxiety, violent fits, and episodes of self-scarification that are subdued and intensify once again, a momentum of lulled and re-awakened "madness" akin to war-torn Beirut. Zahra practices a form of self-scarification by picking at the violent eruptions of acne on her face and body, and "in the calm light of day," "inspects the ravages of the latest onslaught" (24) as though inspecting the damage of a building's gutted visage from a night of fighting.

As opposed to Tamima, whose rejection of filiative belonging (in her family) causes her to question the exclusionary relations of filiative belonging in the national sense, Zahra's madness returns her to a place within the boundaries of familial and national loyalty. To escape her uncle's sexual advances, Zahra decides to marry another Lebanese immigrant to whose impoverished imagination Africa "was made of diamonds … hung from the trees or buried in sand dunes," much as Saudi Arabia had evoked for him a landscape "strewn with gold watches" (66). Zahra's madness leads her to divorce her husband and return to Beirut, where at the height of the civil war in the 1980s the madness grows. Her capacity for self-destruction peaks as she seeks out the neighborhood sniper to take as a lover. Zahra becomes pregnant, and shortly after she informs him of her pregnancy, he guns her down from his rooftop perch. Al-Shaykh does not exempt Zahra from a somatic rendering of war's trauma and inflicts damage to the site of her body contiguously with the material, geographical, social body of Beirut. Zahra's final integration into Lebanon's war-machine is set off against the immutable and idealized symbol of Lebanon with which Hashem associates her. Zahra's madness, self-destructive as Lebanon's war to invent a community from competing sects, leads her to believe it is possible to create a family with the sniper, the "war's utmost representative" in controlling movement, enforcing isolation, making the already-segregated neighborhoods emptier, alienating, uninhabitable. Her madness embodies the war's erasure of the nation: through its schizophrenic creation of irreconcilable "realities" on the ground, it maintains the momentum of the war by pursuing self-preservation through division and alienation, by forcibly and self-defeatingly segregating communities to construct the larger nation.

Zahra is situated in a family crisis similar to the one that threatens Tamima and Aisha in *Death in Beirut*. Both Awwad and Al-Shaykh propel this crisis of failed fathers and fallen brothers to the surface of the narratives. The crisis insists upon the collapse of the private and the public

sphere in analyzing failed state formation in Palestine, dissolution of the state in Lebanon, and the representation, albeit out-of-focus, of recovering Guinea in its post-independence years. In assessing the significance of social and cultural practices to the field of national politics in South African and Palestinian liberation struggles, John Collins cites South African writer Ndebele, who critiques the privileging of "state-level politics" within "nationalist discourse": "Politics is not only the seizure of state power, it is also the seizure of power in a woman's burial society in a township; it is the seizure of family power by children, thus altering drastically the nature of the family, something that might have tremendous implications for the new society to be born" (84). Between the tenor of national politics to deliver its people to liberation and the neglected vehicle of social and cultural practices and politics to do so, Aisha lies submerged in her father's narrative, mutely out-of-focus. Tamima takes herself out of focus and right into an underground struggle. Zahra becomes increasingly buried in a madness that renders her as inscrutable, elusive, and unpredictable as the war has been to Lebanon.

By the time the novels were written, Afro-Arab transnational alliances, based on a shared lineage of colonialism and liberation struggles, already indicated an engagement with containment and isolation.[21] The novels' rearticulation of African and Arab identities, and the problems of nationalism, exclusion, and containment central to the relationship, in the space of the home/ "domus" atomizes the naturalized border of the state represented by domopolitics. In doing so, it actually denaturalizes the border of the home, the family and the state, and thus undermines the logic of containment. That is because the home plays a strategic role in linking radical ruptures (nationalism, racism) with more measured changes (familial betrayal and violations). Thus, the wider social space of Afro-Arab relations seen through the lens of everyday stories of national interdependence and exclusion becomes a mediation of radical politics. The potential for a shift in consciousness, as with Tamima and Zahra, rests at the conjuncture, the crossroads, of the micrological stories of the everyday and the macrological dimensions of power. The productive element of attention to the minute, the home, the microcosm of the larger nation, whether to objects or acts of everyday life is the impact to make dialectic the Afro-Arab relationship and to make dialectic a radical politics. The everyday is the lens through which social power and relations become manifest (the everyday of the home). The space of the home in the novels actually subverts the naturalized order of the border of the state and the logic of containment it atomizes because it renders an account of the home as relational, one that does not secrete power relations, where the home and the home-as-nation as spaces of isolation par excellence are not conveyed as natural (take Jaber's rape of his sister, for example) or given.

The cultural and social implications of containment strategy are played out in the quotidian practices of building a home and family. The national and geopolitical discourses cannot be easily separated from the

cultural and social practices of street-level intimations and of familial life, what is considered private, personal, and individual. The discourse of containment inevitably leads to how such isolation plays out on the microsocial spaces. The consequences of isolating a region and conflict—the tracing of blood diamonds themselves based on "bloodlines" traced to Middle Eastern ancestry—are then reducible to the containment of the familial and individual bloodline to which the African, Arab, or Arab-African belongs. Arresting and containing the bloodline, as demonstrated in the novels, is one expression of this geopolitical strategy. The body politic's bloodline is inextricable from the individual body's bloodline. It is not enough to discuss geopolitical strategy without pursuing its street-level intimations. The novels represent the repercussions of containment at home, in the family, and through the body of its members as if the violence required for maintaining the integrity of these filiative, blood-bound ties were a mirror of the larger, social, global intimations of containment.

Conclusion

The project of placing side by side these two very different genres offers insight into the divergent treatment of national identification and containment characterizing Afro-Arab relations in journalistic and human rights work, as well as in the allegorical treatment of Arab (Lebanese) relationships to Africa in the novels. The diamond pipeline of discourse and representation, whether current or winding back several years, critically points to the limits and possibilities of discourse that can bind but also disunify Afro-Arab movements and alliances. Discourse on Afro-Arab relations has either been skeptical of the relationship as myth or supportive of it as a shared Third-World struggle. Through quotidian aspects of family betrayal and conflict, the novels reveal that the Arab diaspora has not been limited to the West, but reflect on routes of migration between the Middle East and Africa since the colonial period.[22] The novels also reveal how the cultures of the characters are mutually constitutive of one another while simultaneously being inflected by the project of colonialism.

 The novelists reveal boundaries of national belonging containing Africa from the Arab world through crises of family betrayal that invoke new ways of building alliances, evoking the shift from filiative to affiliative identification, or one based on political alliances rather than on family, clan, nation-at-large. By breaking down the boundaries that contain differences at "home," by resisting entrance into nationally based political movements, by refusing to choose one primary means of identification that depends on the violent exclusion of others, the novelists suggest the possibility of breaking down the larger containments dividing the nation from the global community. Placing the genres side-by-side

points to the stark inextricability of a geopolitical strategy of containment from its practice in the space of home, family, and body. Pursuing the strategy of containment in human-rights and journalistic reports to its conclusion in the day-to-day portrait in the novels leads to examining its effect from national to filiative borders—the containment of the "bloodline."

Notes

1. Also known as "conflict diamonds," "blood diamonds" are mined in areas controlled by rebel forces that sell diamonds to purchase arms and fund military actions that fuel civil conflict. These diamonds are often the main source of funding for rebels, arms merchants, smugglers, and diamond traders. Large sums of money are at stake, so bribes, threats, torture, and murder have become the modes of operation in controlling diamonds.

2. Douglas Farah, "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade." *Washington Post*, November 2, 2001.

3. See Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* 273 (1994). Kaplan became one of the leading experts on the Third-World order, post-9/11, which defines "security" in terms of containment and argues that the collapse of social systems in Africa, as well as the rest of the Third World wherein he locates similar signs of "anarchy," will precipitate the collapse of the West.

4. See George Kennan and John Lukacs, *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997).

5. See George W. Bush, "West Point Commencement Address," June 1, 2002. www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (Accessed October 1, 2008). Bush announced the ineffectiveness of containment policies: "For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment … Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing, against shadowy, terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorists' allies."

6. See Rita Abrahamsen, "A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa and Britain's War on Terrorism," *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 2 (2004), 678.

7. See US Government, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington D.C.: White House, 2002). The paper states: "In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror."

8. See Farah, "Digging Up Congo's Dirty Gems," *Washington Post*, December 30, 2001.

9. See Farah, "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade," *Washington Post*, November 2, 2001.

10. See Nicholas Stein, "A New Cut on an Old Monopoly," *Fortune*, 143 (2001), 196. In addition, the initiative is not being enforced, causing activists to call for more monitoring and regulations. See Amnesty International, press release, July 31, 2003, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL300112003.

11. Farah's articles on Al Qaeda's connection to diamond smuggling range from 2001 to 2004 and include the following: "They Fought for Nothing, and That's What They Got." *Washington Post,* September 1, 2001; "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems from Sierra Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say." *Washington Post,* November 1, 2001; "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade," *Washington Post*, November 2, 2001; "An 'Axis' Connected to Gaddafi: Leaders in Libya Have Used War to Safeguard Wealth." *Washington Post*, November 2, 2001; "Al Qaeda's Growing Sanctuary." *Washington Post*, July 14, 2004.

12. Rather than a precise description, the term "rogue regimes" is a politically charged one. It is defined as "an authoritarian political system that …proves itself indifferent or hostile to the welfare and democratic preferences of its people and the legitimate security interests of other political communities." See Peter Schulte, "Rogue Regimes, WMD, and Hyper-Terrorism: Augustine and Aquinas Meet Chemical Ali," in *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Charles Reed and David Ryall, 143 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). In 2005 research findings on the validity of the term, the authors claim that "rogue regime" aggressiveness to international security has not been empirically tested: "The results of our analysis show that rogue states have not posed a generalized threat to international security as measured by interstate conflict behavior. As its critics have long suspected, the rogue concept seems to be at best a questionable foundation on which to build general foreign and defense policies." See Mary Capriole and Peter Trumbore, "Rhetoric versus Reality: Rogue States in Interstate Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 5 (2005), 788.

13. Gberie has written on Sierra Leone's Lebanese communities financing Hezbollah and Al Qaeda in "War and Peace in Sierra Leone."

14. See Chris Bierwirth, "The Initial Establishment of the Lebanese Community in Côte d'Ivoire, ca. 1924-1945," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 30 (1997). Before 1940, the Lebanese were often called "Syrians," as "Syria" refers to the entire Levantine region. Lebanese gained entry into more privileged positions in Côte d'Ivoire's colonial economy by displacing the French "petit blanc," the French traders occupying the intermediary level of commerce between large export houses and indigenous producers. In the 1930s, the "petit blanc" were the ones whom the "Lebanese trader challenged and displaced in the interwar period." No longer occupying the lowest levels of trade in the colony, the Lebanese began to occupy the middle levels of trade. The "grandes sociétés," the large European commercial firms such as the Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) and the Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain (SCOA) that imported manufactured goods and exported cash cops, still controlled the import and export trade.

15. See "Africa: Red Weeds Grow in New Soil," *Time Magazine*, September 12, 1960, 29.

16. See David Lloyd, "La rigueur dans le désespoir," *Politics and Culture* 1 (2004), http://aspen.conncoll.edu/politicsandculture/page.cfm?key=301.

17. See Louise White, "Cars Out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 443.

18. The year in which the car was manufactured coincides with Lebanon's reawakened brutal sectarian war. See Robert Fisk's *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 70. The year also coincides with Guinea's independence from France. See Gberie, "Destabilizing Guinea." Like Fisk, Gberie is interested in the discrepancies between the myths of independence and its realities during this time. He describes the gap between the myth of independence and the reality of French campaigns of economic divestment to "isolate the new African nation."

19. See Aamir Mufti, "Auerbach in Istanbul: Edward Said, Secular Criticism, and the Question of Minority Culture," *Critical Inquiry* 25 (1998), 112.

20. See William Walters, "Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics," *Citizenship Studies* 8, no. 3 (2004): 237-260. As Walters

writes,"*domopolitics* refers to the government of the state (but, crucially, other political spaces as well) as a home."

21. By the time *Death in Beirut* was published in 1972, the alliance between African and Arab nationalisms through the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and Arab states, under Gamal Abdul Nasser's leadership, had gained momentum. See Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955). Nasser declared his support for sub-Saharan African nationalists and rejuvenated the identification of the alliance between the Arab world and Africa (albeit through a declaration of Egypt's position in the concentric circles of Afro-Arab relations, namely Muslim, African, and Arab). Nasser also provided financial support to nationalist and resistance groups in sub-Saharan Africa, including scholarships for military insurrectionists. The alliance between the OAU and Arab states gained strength due to Israel's connections with South Africa and Portugal, as well as the international perception of Israel's formation and existence as a form of Palestinian colonization and "bantustanisation." Two years after *Death in Beirut*'s publication, the momentum culminated in what Ali Mazrui perceives as a gesture of shared "ideological radicalism" in "Black Africa and the Arabs," *Foreign Affairs* 53 (1975), 736. From a shared lineage of colonialism and liberation movements the Afro-Arab alliance emerged when the 1974 Grand Assembly invited PLO leader Yasser Arafat and suspended South Africa's participation from the sessions.

22. Although the novels reflect on routes of migration between the Middle East and Africa since the colonial period, routes between Africa and the Near East are documented since the seventh century. Islam spread through the Near East and North Africa in the seventh century. From North Africa, it was carried into east and southern Africa. Arab and Persian sea trade flourished from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to East Africa. With Islam came monotheism, Arabic language and writing, Arabic and Persian literature, coined money, and bureaucratic government. Islam, and its constitutive cultural markers, specifically monotheism, the Arabic language, literature, and bureaucratic government were considerably modified by African customs, becoming a powerful force.

Works Cited

Abrahamsen, Rita. "A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa and Britain's War on Terrorism." *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 2 (2004): 677-84. Print.

Al-Shaykh, Hanan. *The Story of Zahra*. Translated by Peter Ford with the cooperation of Hanan Al-Shaykh. New York: Anchor, 1986. Print.

Amnesty International, press release, July 31, 2003.
      http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL300112003. Web.

Awwad, Tawfiq Yusuf. *Death in Beirut*. Translated by Leslie
      McLoughlin. First published in 1972. Colorado Springs, CO: Three
      Continents P, 1995. Print.

Bierwirth, Chris. "The Initial Establishment of the Lebanese Community
      in Côte d'Ivoire, ca. 1924–1945." *International Journal of African
      Historical Studies* 30, no. 2 (1997): 325–48. Print.

Bush, George W. "West Point Commencement Address." June 1, 2002.
      www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html Web.

Capriole, Mary, and Peter Trumbore. "Rhetoric versus Reality: Rogue
      States in Interstate Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 5
      (2005): 770-91. Print.

Chua, Amy. *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy
      Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*. New York: Doubleday,
      2003. Print.

Collins, John. "Exploring Children's Territory: Ghassan Kanafani,
      Njabulo Ndebele, and the 'Generation' of Politics in Palestine and
      South Africa." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1996): 65–86. Print.

Cooper, Frederick, and Laura Stoler, eds. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial
      Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1997.
      Print.

Dunn, Kevin. "Fear of a Black Planet: Anarchy Anxieties and Postcolonial
      Travel to Africa." *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2004): 483–99.
      Print.

Falola, Toyin. "Lebanese Traders in Southwestern Nigeria, 1900–1960."
      African Affairs 89, no. 357 (1990): 523–53. Print.

Fanon, Franz. *Wretched of the Earth*. Originally published in 1963. New
      York: Grove P, 2004. Print.

Farah, Douglas. "They Fought for Nothing, and That's What They Got."
      Washington Post, September 1, 2001. Print.

—. "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems from Sierra
      Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say." *Washington Post*,
      November 1, 2001. Print.

—. "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade." *Washington Post*,
      November 2, 2001. Print.

—. "An 'Axis' Connected to Gaddafi: Leaders in Libya Have Used War to
      Safeguard Wealth." *Washington Post*, November 2, 2001. Print.

—. "Al Qaeda's Growing Sanctuary." *Washington Post*, July 14, 2004.
      Print.

—. "Digging Up Congo's Dirty Gems." *Washington Post*, December 30,
      2001. Print.

Fisk, Robert. *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991.

Gberie, Lansana. "Destabilizing Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor, and
      the Potential for Wider Human Catastrophe." Occasional Paper #1
      from "The Diamonds and Human Security Project." Ottawa, Canada:
      Partnership Africa Canada, 2001. Print.

—. "War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection." Occasional Paper #6 from "The Diamonds and Human Security Project." Ottawa, Canada: Partnership Africa Canada, 2002. Print.

Kaplan, Robert. "The Coming Anarchy." *The Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (1994): 44–76. Print.

Kennan, George, and John Lukacs. *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946*. Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1997.

Lloyd, David. "La rigueur dans le désespoir." *Politics and Culture* 1, 2004. http://aspen.conncoll.edu/politicsandculture/page.cfm?key=301

Mazrui, Ali. "Black Africa and the Arabs." *Foreign Affairs* 53, no. 4 (1975): 725–42. Print.

Mufti, Aamir. "Auerbach in Istanbul: Edward Said, Secular Criticism, and the Question of Minority Culture." *Critical Inquiry* 25 (1998): 95–125. Print.

Nasser, Gamal Abdul. *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs P, 1955. Print.

Reed, Charles, and David Ryall, eds. *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.

Said, Edward. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983. Print.

Schulte, Peter. "Rogue Regimes, WMD, and Hyper-Terrorism: Augustine and Aquinas Meet Chemical Ali." In *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century*. Ed. Charles Reed and David Ryall, 136-156. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.

Scott, James. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1968. Print.

Stein, Nicholas. "A New Cut on an Old Monopoly." *Fortune* 143, no. 4 (2001): 186–99. Print.

US Government, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington D.C.: White House, 2002. Print.

White, Louise. "Cars Out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa." In *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Ed. Frederick Cooper and Laura Stoler, 436–60. Berkeley: U of California P, 1997. Print.